• uralsolo [he/him]@hexbear.net
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    1 year ago

    80% of the Japanese military was being slowly routed in China while America was hopping between islands and building genocide bombs. The American conflict with Japan is better understood as the inevitable clash of two empires expanding into the same place, rather than some kind of rescue of the Koreans, half of whom are still under American occupation.

    • Gsus4@feddit.nl
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      1 year ago

      An oil embargo, lend-lease over the Himalayas and the Pacific war culminating in Japan’s surrender helped China repel Japan a lot more than 20%, but sure “death to murica”.

      • uralsolo [he/him]@hexbear.net
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        1 year ago

        You seem to be under the impression that I think America deserves 20% credit for dislodging the Japanese Empire. I’m sorry for giving you this mistaken impression, because in truth America deserves 0% credit for doing it. America did not defeat the Japanese Empire and liberate the former imperial holdings, they simply captured it for themselves instead.

        Also the effectiveness of lend-lease and other actions taken by America to weaken their imperial rival economically are greatly overstated.

      • zephyreks [none/use name]@hexbear.net
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        1 year ago

        Lend-lease over the Himalayas was rather futile and happened more of political reasons than for strategic value.

        As for the embargo? It’s a byproduct of US war profiteering given that Japan imported something like 70% of their iron, 80% of their oil, and 90% of their copper from the US in 1939.

        The Pacific War is a valid point insofar as it forced Japanese industrial capacity to focus on naval strength rather than land arms, but it’s a rather misguided one given that a huge chunk of Japanese forces was stuck in China locked in a stalemate, which made the Pacific Theater far less contested than it otherwise would have been (notably, this meant that Australia was safe from Japanese occupation because Japan lacked the resources to invade Australia).